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Three Perspectives on Neutrality and
Drift in Molecular Evolution
Michael R. Dietrich†
This article offers three contrasting cases of the use of neutrality and drift in
molecular evolution. In the first, neutrality is assumed as a simplest case for
modeling. In the second and third, concepts of drift and neutrality are developed
within the context of population genetics testing and the development and application of the molecular clock.

1. Introduction. The importance of random drift for the field of molecular evolution is undeniable, even if its relative significance has been the
subject of intense controversy. Random drift was given a leading role in
the development of molecular evolution by Motoo Kimura, Tomoko
Ohta, Tom Jukes, Jack King, and others. Beginning in the late 1960s,
advocates of neutral molecular evolution presented it as a radical alternative to the omnipotence of natural selection in biological evolution.
Jack King and Tom Jukes even dubbed neutral molecular evolution “nonDarwinian,” in a successful attempt to provoke organismal evolutionary
biologists (Dietrich 1994, 1998). According to the neutralists, random
genetic drift at least partially displaced selection at the molecular level
because a large number of observed molecular changes were postulated
to be free from natural selection or are very weakly selected—that is to
say, a large number of mutations were understood to be neutral or nearly
neutral (Kimura 1968; King and Jukes 1969). Although advocates of
neutral molecular evolution set off a long-standing controversy with selectionists, hypotheses and models of neutrality and drift fundamentally
shaped the field of molecular evolution (Ohta and Gillespie 1996).
In this article I will argue that considerations of neutrality and drift
entered into the study of molecular evolution first as the simplest cases
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in stochastic modeling. In the context of the neutralist-selectionist debates
after 1970, concepts and models of neutrality and drift were articulated
in two parallel enterprises: one arising from population genetics, concerning the development of statistical tests of neutrality, and another arising from comparative biochemistry, concerning the constant rate of substitution at the molecular level known as the molecular clock. Rather than
try to present a seamless, comprehensive narrative of the rise of neutral
molecular evolution, I am going to condense out of this history three
contrasting episodes. In the end, I will point to some more philosophical
questions that I think these episodes raise.
2. Assumed Neutrality. The idea that there might be mutations that have
no selective value, either positive or negative, was common in population
genetics in the mid-twentieth century (Dobzhanksy 1955; Crow 1985).
Neutral alleles and the random drift of their frequencies in a population
were familiar features of many population genetics models. Early work
by Sewall Wright, R. A. Fisher, and J. B. S. Haldane developed models
of neutral alleles in order to understand processes of drift, especially in
relation to processes of selection and migration. These early neutral models allowed population geneticists to make comparative judgments about
the efficacy of selection, for instance. Assuming neutrality also had the
advantage of allowing modelers to work with mathematically simpler
models. Different aspects of a model could be explored using the assumption of neutrality and then made more realistic and complicated by
adding in selection.
Motoo Kimura entered evolutionary biology as an expert on stochastic
population genetics. Throughout the 1950s, he developed a method of
analysis using diffusion equations, which he applied to a range of stochastic problems including the random assortment of chromosomes in
paramecium, the interaction of selection and drift in finite populations,
and the probability of fixation of a neutral allele (Kimura 1957, 1985).
In the early period, before 1966, Kimura saw neutral mutations as a
possibility, but not as a reality. The introduction of molecular data into
evolutionary genetics and the early development of the study of molecular
evolution in the 1960s convinced Kimura and others that systems of
neutral alleles did exist. This reification fundamentally altered the interpretation of stochastic models of neutral alleles and made their outcomes
much more relevant to the practice of experimental evolutionary genetics
and molecular evolution.
This shift in status of neutral assumptions is beautifully illustrated by
the case of the infinite alleles model presented by Motoo Kimura and
James Crow in 1964. The infinite alleles model was constructed in the
context of the classical balance debate over the relative proportions of
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homozygous and heterozygous loci in natural population. James Crow
was an advocate of the classical position, that is, that there was a large
amount of homozygosity in natural populations maintained by purifying
selection. As such, he was interested in trying to predict the number of
different alleles that could be maintained in a population. In other words,
he wanted to be able to predict the homozygosity of a population. But
he also wanted to assume that every new mutation was a mutation to a
new allele—so mutation did not create any new homozygosity. In 1958,
he set this problem for Motoo Kimura, who had already been recognized
as one of the best stochastic modelers in population genetics (Crow 1989).
Kimura sent a solution a few months later for the case of neutral alleles.
Crow and Kimura collaborated two years later to produce a more complete characterization of what became known as the infinite alleles model
(Kimura and Crow 1964).
In their 1964 paper, Kimura and Crow examined some of the population
consequences of three different allele systems: “(1) A system of selectively
neutral isoalleles whose frequency in the population is determined by the
mutation rate and by random drift. (2) A system of mutually heterotic
alleles. (3) A mixture of heterotic and harmful mutants” (1964, 725). The
systems of heterotic alleles (heterozygote superior or overdominant alleles)
and heterotic and harmful alleles were developed to argue against the
balance position’s assertion that large numbers of heterozygous combinations were maintained in natural populations. For both of these cases,
Kimura and Crow constructed an equilibrium model that allowed them
to calculate the proportion of homozygous loci, the effective number of
alleles maintained in a population, and the segregational load. A segregational load occurs when the most fit genotype is the heterozygote and
Mendelian segregation insures that in each generation inferior homozygous combinations will be formed. The segregation load is the decrease
in the fitness of the population that occurs as the result of the formation
of the less fit homozygotes. It is important to note that the paper’s main
argument is intended to cast doubt on assertions made by advocates of
the balance position. Specifically, they argued against Bruce Wallace’s
assertion that Drosophila are heterozygous at 50% of their loci. Using
their model, Kimura and Crow calculated the segregational load that
would be produced if there were 10,000 loci total. The resulting load was
very high and suggested that most loci are homozygous (Kimura and
Crow 1964, 736).
The empirical application of the selected cases of the infinite alleles
model stands in contrast to the neutral case. The neutral model was
acknowledged as “unrealistic,” but Kimura and Crow thought that it
could “help provide some insight as to what situations were possible or
likely in a natural population” (1964, 735). In the neutral case, its formulas
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allowed them to calculate homozygosity for different parameter values.
The results were then interpreted as representing the “upper limit for
heterozygosity in a population” because introducing directional selection
or relaxing the infinite allele assumptions would increase the proportion
of homozygosity. The result is only about the relationship posited within
the model for an imagined situation. Kimura and Crow explicitly noted
that they did not want to argue for the plausibility of neutral alleles.
The shift to the advocacy of the neutral theory and the existence of
neutral alleles after 1968 then involves realizing and advocating the fact
that the simplest mathematical case may in fact hold in nature. With the
advent of the neutral theory, the mathematical treatment of the neutral
case became much more important than the argument against the balance
position. In fact, now the 1964 paper is remembered for making predictions important for testing the neutral theory (Crow 1989). At the time,
the consequences of the neutral case were seen as idealized limits, not as
empirical predictions about natural systems.
3. Tests of Neutrality and Selection. While Kimura advocated the importance of neutral mutations and random drift, he never advocated that
all mutations were neutral. The neutralist-selectionist debate was extremely polarized during the 1970s and 1980s, but it was not an all-ornothing debate pitting drift against selection. Like virtually all major
controversies in evolutionary genetics, the neutralist-selectionist controversy was a relative-frequency controversy where the relative contributions
of drift and selection were at issue (Beatty 1995). The neutral theory gave
important roles to both selection and drift. In fact, selection played an
indispensable role determining the fate of most mutations. In order to
appreciate this you have to understand that Kimura carefully distinguished between the process of mutation and the process of substitution
(Kimura 1983).
When Kimura argued for the existence of large numbers of neutral
alleles, he was making a claim about observed substitutions. Kimura,
Ohta, and others acknowledged that there was a range of mutations that
included a small number of advantageous mutants, some portion of neutral and near neutral mutants, and a substantial number of deleterious
mutants. While there is some discussion about the relative proportions of
these mutant classes, they agree that directional selection will quickly
eliminate a large proportion of the deleterious mutants and quickly fix
the truly advantageous mutants. The remaining mutants will be clustered
around the completely neutral class of mutants. These mutants will be
subject to either weak selection or no selection. Neutral and very weakly
selected or nearly neutral mutants would be subject to random drift. What
Kimura meant by random drift was that allele frequencies in a population
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would randomly fluctuate as a result of gamete sampling in reproduction
each generation (Kimura 1983). So neutral and nearly neutral mutants
would drift until they became either fixed in a population or lost. The
neutralists’ claim is that the neutral mutations may represent only a fraction of the total number of mutations when they occur, but “most mutants
that spread into a species are neutral” (Kimura and Ohta 1971, 469).
The distinction between neutral mutants and substitutions is epistemically driven. Neutral mutation cannot be observed; substituted differences can. Actually, what stage of the substitution process is represented
by observed molecular differences is not perfectly clear (see below). The
point of the distinction between mutation and substitution is that observed
differences have been subject to selection and drift before we have observed them. Observed molecular differences then are the outcomes of a
random process of mutation, which Kimura understood as produced
largely from DNA replication error, processes of directional selection, and
processes of random drift produced by gamete sampling. We can detect
mutants that have been fixed or are in the process of spreading through
a species. Because the time to fixation for a neutral allele can be very
long, these transient alleles appear as polymorphisms in a population.
Understood from this perspective, then, Kimura and Ohta are claiming
that most protein polymorphisms are transient—they are neutral alleles
on their meandering path toward fixation or loss. In terms of their histories, both fixed differences and polymorphisms have gone through the
similar processes of mutation, selection, and drift; polymorphisms are just
not as far along as are fixed differences.
Kimura and Ohta claimed that one of the principle virtues of the neutral
theory was that it generated testable predictions, and in so doing promised
to “emancipate” biologists from “naı̈ve panselectionism” (Kimura and
Ohta 1971, 469). Using the diffusion equation method, Kimura and Ohta
generated a number of quantitative predictions for neutral alleles. For
instance, in 1969, Kimura and Tomoko Ohta calculated the average number of generations until a neutral mutant was either lost or fixed in a
finite population (Kimura and Ohta 1969). The average time to fixation
was 4Ne. These kinds of quantitative predictions, coupled with the promise
of electrophoretic data in the late 1960s, spurred Crow and others to argue
in favor of the neutral theory—not as a correct theory, but as a highly
testable theory (Crow 1969). Selectionist critics such as G. Ledyard Stebbins, Richard Lewontin, and Francisco Ayala were less convinced that
decisive tests could be conducted and deployed Popperian ideas of falsifiability to assail neutralist hypotheses (Stebbins and Lewontin 1972;
Ayala et al.1974). Both attitudes were justified. The neutral theory did
indeed make a large number of testable quantitative predictions, but most
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of the tests from 1970 until 1985 to detect neutrality and selection were
not considered decisive.
Testing the neutral theory ran into two main problems. On the one
hand, statistical tests, such as the one proposed by Warren Ewens in 1972,
were very promising, but they turned out to have little statistical power.
It was not possible to reject the neutral null hypothesis using the Ewens
test, for instance. On the other hand, nonstatistical tests were disputed
and considered indecisive. For instance, Francisco Ayala’s group used
data about electrophoretic variability in natural populations of Drosophila
to test a range of neutralist predictions. Using a measure of heterozygosity
predicted using an infinite alleles model, Ayala and his coworkers noted
that the frequency distribution of heterozygous loci was significantly different. Instead of the predicted distribution clustered around the average
heterozygosity of 0.177, the distribution was fairly even except for an
excess of loci with very little heterozygosity. This excess of rare alleles
was seen as an explanatory failure of the neutral theory (Ayala et al. 1974,
378). In response, Jack King noted that many of the assumptions made
in the infinite alleles model could be the source for the rare alleles discrepancy. Others noted that the infinite alleles model was not appropriate
for electrophoretic data, since electrophoretic classes probably encompassed many allelic differences (King 1976). Ayala and his coworkers were
sensitive to these criticisms and discussed mutation models for electromorphs as well as the models’ assumptions. In the course of the give and
take over these models, Kimura and Ohta began to advocate a larger role
for slightly deleterious mutants whose frequencies would still be subject
to drift. Others, such as Masatoshi Nei, began to emphasize shifting population dynamics such as those resulting from population bottlenecks.
These kinds of results were influential in that they drove revisions of both
the neutralist and selectionist models, but they were not decisive in terms
of resolving the dispute between neutralists and selectionists.
The availability of DNA sequence data after 1985 represents a significant turning point for the neutral theory and its tests. Using DNA sequence data, Martin Kreitman and others devised statistical tests that
could statistically distinguish between neutrality and selection. These statistical tests subject a neutral null hypothesis to rejection (Kreitman 2000).
The success of this method has been hailed by Jim Crow as one of the
most important events in the history of molecular evolution. However, it
is important to note that the frequent rejection of neutral null hypotheses
does not necessarily imply the demise of the neutral theory. The relationship between statistical null hypotheses and the neutral theory is complicated by the introduction of new neutral models of sequence evolution,
new data about DNA sequences, and new methods, such as coalescents,
which make neutral assumptions. Most important, however, the popu-
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lation genetic tradition of testing was only one avenue of support for the
neutral theory.
4. Comparative Molecular Evolution and the Molecular Clock. Molecular
evolution emerged from the interaction of a number of different disciplines
(Dietrich 1994). Neutralists, such as Kimura and Ohta, had strong backgrounds in population genetics, but readily made use of the data and
techniques emerging from biochemistry that used comparisons of various
biochemical properties of molecules to draw evolutionary conclusions. At
the forefront of these efforts were biochemists such as Tom Jukes, Emile
Zuckerkandl, Morris Goodman, and Alan Wilson (Dietrich 1994; Hagen
1999).
In 1965, Emile Zuckerkandl and Linus Pauling articulated what has
been referred to as “the most significant result of research in molecular
evolution” (Wilson et al. 1977). By comparing the amino acids sequences
of proteins from different species, Zuckerkandl and Pauling found that
the sequence differences were “approximately proportional in number to
evolutionary time” (Zuckerkandl and Pauling 1965, 148). In other words,
the rate of amino acid substitution was approximately constant. In 1965,
they christened this constancy the molecular clock (Zuckerkandl and Pauling 1965; Morgan 1998). Zuckerkandl and Pauling invoked both selection
and drift to explain the constancy of the clock (Morgan 1998). After 1968,
however, Motoo Kimura, Allan Wilson, and others used the neutral theory
of molecular evolution to explain the mechanism of the clock
Rate constancy at the molecular level followed easily from the basic
theoretical commitments of Kimura and the neutralists. According to the
neutralists, the rate per generation of mutant substitutions in a population
is equal to the mutation rate per gamete. The rate of evolution for selectively advantageous mutants, in contrast to neutral mutants, is dependent on both population size and selection pressure. Thus, in order for
a selectionist model to account for the constancy of the rates of evolution,
it must show how constancy is possible when the rates are strongly dependent on the environment, as represented by the selection coefficient s
and the measure of population size N, which can be quite variable. Under
the selectionist model, the rates of molecular evolution should show nearly
the same variability as the rates of phenotypic evolution. Unfortunately
for the neutralists, the rates of molecular evolution were found to be far
from uniform.
The rate of amino acid substitution was known from the beginning
(1965) to vary among different proteins. The neutralists explained this
difference in terms of different proteins having different fractions of neutral mutants; the number of neutral mutants depends on the functional
constraints for each protein. So, for instance, fibrinopeptide A has a much
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higher rate of substitution than histone IV, which is highly constrained
(King and Jukes 1969, 792). But even within protein families variation
was observed. So, for instance, insulins in the line leading to guinea pigs
seem to have evolved faster than insulins in other lines (King and Jukes
1969; Ohta and Kimura 1971, 19). The neutralists needed a way to explain
these deviations from the intrinsic rate of molecular evolution.
In 1971, Ohta and Kimura analyzed these variations in proteins statistically. When they did this for different alpha and beta hemoglobins,
and for cytochrome c, they found that observed variance in the beta
hemoglobin and the cytochrome c were significantly larger than expected.
From this they concluded that “the variations in evolutionary rates among
highly evolved animals are larger than expected from chance” (Ohta and
Kimura 1971, 21). Ohta and Kimura did not take this as a reason to give
up the neutral theory. The increased variance in substitution rates was
chalked up to a small fraction of advantageous mutations that affect the
molecule’s function but do not interfere with the constancy of the overall
rate of substitution (1971, 23).
After Ohta and Kimura’s paper in 1971, a tremendous amount of empirical research was done on the molecular clock (Wilson et al. 1977).
Charles Langley and Walter Fitch, for instance, used a procedure based
on minimum phyletic distances to test whether or not the process of
nucleotide substitution was a constant Poisson process. They concluded
that “it is clear that the total rate of substitution (as observed through
the minimum phyletic distance procedure) varies markedly in geological
time and among divergent lines of descent” (Langley and Fitch 1974,
174). Similar conclusions stressing the nonuniformity of rates in hemoglobin and a slowdown of rates in primate lineages were offered by Goodman, Moore, and Matsuda (1975). In 1981, Morris Goodman used the
variability in the clock to argue against the existence of the molecular
clock and against Kimura’s explanation of it in terms of the neutral theory.
By 1983, even Kimura himself admitted that the rate of molecular evolution was not perfectly uniform (Kimura 1983, 79), but, in his opinion,
“emphasizing local fluctuations as evidence against the neutral theory,
while neglecting to inquire why the overall rate is intrinsically so regular
or constant is picayunish. It is a classic case of ‘not seeing the forest for
the trees’” (Kimura 1983, 85).
The tension between variability and constancy in the molecular clock
is in part unavoidable. As a statistical object, the molecular clock is an
aggregate characterized by a central tendency (most commonly an average
or mean) and dispersion from that tendency. How much variability can
be tolerated depends on how the constancy of the clock itself is interpreted.
Some biologists thought of the molecular clock as an average: it referred
to the average rate of substitution for a given population of molecules
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or molecular sequences. Other biologists, however, thought of it as more
than an average. They thought of the clock as an intrinsic property of
individual molecules. For them, averaging over a population of molecules,
each with their own individual rate, was a means of discerning the underlying intrinsic rate of that type of molecule.
This subtle difference in the interpretation of the statistical constitution
of the molecular clock reflected profound differences in the kinds of mechanisms proposed for the clock (selective vs. neutral) as well as in the value
of formulating general principles or laws for evolutionary processes. For
instance, Allan Wilson extended Kimura’s argument concerning “the rule
of the molecular clock” and its exceptions by framing it in terms of a
larger conceptual divide (Wilson, Ochman, and Prager 1987). Wilson and
his coauthors admit that there will be exceptions to the rule of the molecular clock, but, like Kimura, they emphasize its so-called intrinsic rate.
Faced with the twin phenomena of a statistical mean and variation about
that mean, Wilson et al. argued that one had to choose either the perspective of a naturalist or a biochemist. The naturalists cherish each individual molecule and its unique historical trajectory. As a result, they
emphasize variability rather than the mean. Wilson believed that naturalists needed to adopt the biochemists’ perspective. In his words, “Biochemists can agree with naturalists that every nucleotide position has a
unique history, as does every atom of gas. But, they also recognize that
the universal gas law (PV p nRT) was not discovered by the detailed
analysis of the behavior of individual atoms. Bringing together molecular
biology and natural history in the search for general laws of evolution
requires, as many naturalists now recognize, a willingness to transcend
‘microscopic’ analysis” (Wilson et al. 1987). From the biochemists’ perspective, the constancy of the rate of molecular evolution was the important phenomenon, not the variability. Neutralists, like Kimura and
Wilson, argued that different types of molecules had characteristic intrinsic
rates of evolution. So, all cytochrome c molecules, for instance, shared
the same intrinsic property of evolving at approximately the same rate.
The rate of each molecule type was determined by the rate of mutation
and the distribution of conserved and nonconserved sites. Highly conserved sites were inferred to remain unchanged because alterations would
hamper the molecule’s function and so be selected against. Nonconserved
sites changed freely and so were considered to be free from selection.
It is important to note that rate constancy is produced by the same
processes thought to inform neutral models of populations, such as the
infinite alleles model. The difference is in the form of the outcome (Millstein 2002). So , while population genetics tests were plagued by low power,
the molecular clock was considered to be strong evidence in favor of the
neutral theory (Kimura and Ohta 1971). This does not mean that the
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clock has not been subject to challenge and revision. High variability in
the molecular clock for many molecules is now widely accepted. This high
variability has forced neutralists to revise their explanations for rate constancy and has provided an opening for selectionist explanations that can
explain both patterns of constancy and variability (Takahata 1987; Gillespie 1991).
5. Conclusion. There is no other field in biology where random drift is
as important as it is in the field of molecular evolution. While neutral
molecular evolution has been hotly contested, the controversy that marked
the 1970s and 1980s has significantly depolarized. The reality of neutral
substitutions and random drift is accepted by all molecular evolutionists,
even if they still quibble about how much neutrality there is, how best to
detect it, and which outcomes can be ascribed to it.
In this article, I have presented three perspectives on neutrality and
drift drawn from the history of molecular evolution. While there are many
more instances that I could have discussed, the three perspectives presented here raise a number of questions that I believe merit consideration.
The changing status of neutral assumptions in the infinite alleles models
highlights the possibility of both instrumentalist and realist uses of neutrality and random drift in biology. Efforts to test the neutral theory and
to explain the molecular clock speak to real historical difficulties of distinguishing neutralist and selectionist outcomes. I have tried to argue that
three different processes (random mutation, directional selection, and random genetic drift) contributed to many different observable neutralist
outcomes. The problem of distinguishing processes using outcomes is one
of producing a reliable association between a specific outcome and the
contribution of processes individually, jointly, or in contrast to some different process. The history of the neutral theory demonstrates that this
is not easy or straightforward, but that it is possible in some cases, such
as with statistical tests of neutrality using DNA sequences.
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